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Abstract To gain insight into the reasons that the public
may have for endorsing or eschewing pharmacological
moral enhancement for themselves or for others, we used
empirical tools to explore public attitudes towards these
issues. Participants (N = 293) from the United States were
recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and were ran-
domly assigned to read one of several contrastive vignettes
in which a 13-year-old child is described as bullying
another student in school and then is offered an empathy-
enhancing program. The empathy-enhancing program is
described as either involving taking a pill or playing a
video game on a daily basis for four weeks. In addition,
participants were asked to imagine either their own child
bullying another student at school, or their own child being
bullied by another student. This resulted in a 2 × 2
between-subjects design. In an escalating series of morally
challenging questions, we asked participants to rate their
overall support for the program; whether they would sup-
port requiring participation; whether they would support
requiring participation of children who are at higher risk to
become bullies in the future; whether they would support
requiring participation of all children or even the entire
population; and whether they would be willing to partici-
pate in the program themselves. We found that people
were significantly more troubled by pharmacological as
opposed to non-pharmacological moral enhancement in-
terventions. The results indicate that members of the public
for the greater part oppose pharmacological moral
bioenhancement, yet are open to non-biomedical means
to attain moral enhancement. [248 words].
Keywords Moral enhancement . Moral
bioenhancement . Experimental neuroethics . Public
attitudes . Empathy .Mandatory interventions
Introduction
Moral competence is universally valued. Religious texts
and the virtue ethics traditions all valorize the attainment
of moral fluency. The Enlightenment brought its own
contributions to the project, with deontology and conse-
quentialism imparting ‘rational’means of defining what
it means to be a moral person [1].
Recently, a debate has emerged regarding the propriety
of moral bioenhancement [2–5]. The suggestion is that we
are on the cusp of understanding the neurological and
genetic underpinnings of moral (and immoral) behaviour,
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and that we should use that knowledge to develop tech-
nologies that enhance human morality. However, what
constitutes moral enhancement is highly contested [6, 7]:
Bclear and precise definitions of Bmoral enhancement^ are
not to be found; what has been called Bmoral^ enhance-
ment ranges from encouraging empathic concern to in-
creasing personal responsibility all the way to heightening
respect for global fairness^ [8]. The debate is highly spec-
ulative. As the science of moral enhancement is Bin its
infancy ,^ neuroscientist Molly Crockett has warned to Bbe
careful not to draw premature conclusions about potential
avenues for moral bioenhancement^ [9]. Most contentious
of all has been the suggestion that moral bioenhancement
ought to be compulsory.1 The debate [12–28] has been
vigorous but is at somewhat of an impasse.
In earlier articles we therefore advocated a more
focused debate on the potential domains for which mor-
al bioenhancement interventions will most likely will be
implemented [29, 30]. Similarly, Harris Wiseman has
advocated a ‘practical-realities first’ approach to poten-
tial moral bioenhancement interventions, implying that
speculation about moral bioenhancement should ac-
count for Bthe specific practical realities to be found on
the ground level, which are not at all incidental but the
very realities around which the abstractions of the de-
bate must be made to shape themselves (not the other
way around)^ [4]. Given that the issue is of interest not
just to philosophers but to the public at large, we ex-
plored public attitudes towards moral bioenhancement
using both quantitative and mixed methods techniques.2
We carefully considered what sort of immoral behav-
iour would be best to evaluate in our studies. We previ-
ously found that the public was generally supportive of
using pharmacological means to alter criminal behaviour
so long as safety was assured [33], but empirical studies
have found criminals to be outside of the circle of moral
concern [34]. It is unclear whether members of the public
are similarly supportive of biological interventions aimed
at persons who engage in immoral yet legal behaviour.
We therefore narrowed our focus to morally contentious
behaviours that are not unlawful. We settled on bullying,
an act that is generally condemned as immoral but usually
does not cross the line to illegality.
Bullying is an act that is intended to harm, takes place
repeatedly, and is characterized by a systematic abuse of
the imbalance of power between the aggressor and target
[35]. Bullying takes place in schools, between siblings, in
prisons, and in the workplace [36], as well as online [37].
The observation that school bullying (both perpetration
and victimization) predicts aggression and violence later
in life has prompted calls for early prevention efforts [38,
39]. Although bullying per se is not the primary target of
the moral bioenhancement debate, commentators have
argued that Bearly childhood is probably the optimal
starting point for moral enhancement^ [40, 41].
Our objective was to test a range of issues that are
central to the debate on moral bioenhancement. We hy-
pothesize that the degree to which members of the public
support an empathy-enhancing moral enhancement pro-
gram depends on whether or not the means employed
were pharmacological or non-pharmacological. We ex-
pect people to be less supportive of pharmacological than
of non-pharmacological programs, even when safety and
efficacy are held constant. In addition, we hypothesize
that people are less supportive of pharmacological moral
enhancement of their own children than they are of other
people’s children. Second, we hypothesize that the degree
to which respondents support these programs depends on
whether they imagine themselves or someone outside
their immediate circle of concern to participate. In other
words, we expect that the distinction between self and
other is relevant [42]. We expect that this distinction
matters more for the pharmacological program than the
pedagogical program. Finally, we hypothesize that the
public is uncomfortable with mandating moral enhance-




In order to explore attitudes of members of the public
towards moral enhancement, we used the contrastive
vignette technique [43]. The key outcome measure
was the difference in group means between contrastive
1 In their first publication on moral enhancement, Ingmar Persson and
Julian Savulescu famously argued: BIf safe moral enhancements are
ever developed, there are strong reasons to believe that their use should
be obligatory, like education or fluoride in the water, since those who
should take them are least likely to be inclined to use them^ [10], and in
subsequent publications they have reaffirmed this position: Bwe do not
rule out that moral bioenhancement could be justifiably imposed
without the informed consent of the subjects^ [11].
2 Previous studies on attitudes towards enhancement of a range of
different traits suggested that people are least open to enhancing traits
they believe to be more fundamental to the self/ identity, which includ-
ed morally relevant traits (such as empathy and kindness) [31, 32].
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conditions rather than individual stated preferences. In
addition to these quantitative measures, we also
employed a novel mixed-methods design in which con-
tent analysis of free-response answers were quantitized
and assessed in a contrastive fashion [44].
Vignette Design Strategy
Participants were presented with one (and only one) of
several contrastive vignettes in which a 13-year-old child
is described as bullying another student in school and
then is offered an empathy-enhancing program. The vi-
gnettes were designed to be minimally contrastive, plau-
sible, and to ensure that the results would be responsive to
the hypothesis under consideration. Vignettes were ana-
lyzed using the Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease and Grade
Level readability tests, and we confirmed that a 15- to 21-
year-old would easily understand the text of the vignettes.
One form of contrast involved the means of moral
enhancement: the empathy-enhancing program was de-
scribed as either involving taking a pill or playing a
video game on a daily basis for four weeks [means:
pharmacological or non-pharmacological]. Both pro-
grams were described as being equally safe and effec-
tive. We took pains to insure that the pharmacological
moral bioenhancement was as innocuous as possible,
describing it as a pill Bbased on the natural hormone
oxytocin^, as we did not want to bias our results with
off-putting interventions such as genetic modification or
deep brain stimulation. A second form of contrast built
into the vignettes compared the closeness to the subject
of the individual who is under consideration for moral
bioenhancement: participants were asked to imagine
either their own child bullying another student at school,
or their own child being bullied by another student at
school [closeness to subject: other’s child or own child].
This resulted in a 2 × 2 between-subjects design.
In an escalating series of morally challenging ques-
tions, we asked participants to what degree they thought
that it would be a good idea for the bully to participate in
the program (question 1; anchors ranging from 0: bad
idea to 100: good idea); to what degree they thought that
it would be a good idea for the bully to be required to
participate in the program (question 3); to what degree
they thought that it would be a good idea for children,
identified by a test to be at higher risk of being bullies in
the future, to be required to participate in the program
(question 5); to what degree they thought it would be a
good idea for all children to be required in the program,
given that the program increases empathy (question 6);
to what degree they thought society would be better off
if the general population was required to participate in
the program (question 7; anchors ranging from 0: much
worse off to 100: much better off); and to what degree
they would be willing to participate in the program
themselves (question 8; anchors ranging from 0: entirely
unwilling to 100: entirely willing).
In the second part of the experiment, we asked par-
ticipants to read a second vignette describing the same
13-year-old child bullying another student at school
(either their child as bully, or their child being bullied),
but this time is being required to participate in an the
alternative empathy-enhancing program: participants
who were initially presented with a program that in-
volved taking a pill daily for four weeks, were now
reading about an alternative program that involves
playing a video game for four weeks – and vice versa.
We presented themwith the rating they gave in response
to question 3, and asked them to what degree they
thought that it would be a good idea for the bully to be
required to participate in this alternative program.
We asked participants to explain the rationale for the
answers they had given to questions 1, 3, and 9, in open
response boxes (questions 2, 4, and 10), which were
coded using Contrastive Quantitized Content Analysis
[44]. A comprehension check probed whether partici-
pants remembered whether the vignette described their
own child engaged in bullying of their own child being
bullied at school. Finally, a pair of questions asked par-
ticipants to optionally tell us whether they or their family
members had been bullied or been bullies themselves.
The vignettes and questions can be found in the
supplemental information. The University of British
Columbia’s Behavioural Research Ethics Board ap-
proved the study.
Sample Population and Survey Format
Participantswere recruited viaAmazon’sMechanical Turk
[45, 46]. Participants provided informed consent, and after
completion of the survey were compensated $0.50. Sur-
veys were administered using Fluid Surveys, and survey
responses were collected online on June 6, 2016.
Statistical Analysis
Data were analyzed using SPSS. Quantitative questions
were analyzed using a two way independent Analysis of
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Variance (ANOVA) to identify significant main and
interaction effects of the two independent variables on
vignette measures. We analyzed significant effects with
independent sample t-tests. Descriptive statistics were
used to characterize the composition and properties of
the sample. The datasets generated during and/or
analysed during the current study are available from
the corresponding author on reasonable request.
Answers entered into the free-response box in ques-
tion 2 were analyzed using the mixed-methods strategy
called Contrastive Quantitized Content Analysis
(CQCA) [44]. The technique provides a mechanism for
quantifying the content of participants’ answers and com-
paring them across contrastive conditions. Answers to the
open-ended questions following questions 3 and 9 were
included, but the data did not appear to be different so
analysis of these responses is not presented here. In order
to mitigate experimenter bias, we first randomized the
full set of comments and blinded the coder to the partic-
ular experimental vignette read by the participant who
offered a given comment. We then carried out traditional
content analysis of the blinded comments, developing
themes iteratively. An initial subset of ~50 comments
was analyzed by two coders, and disagreements were
discussed until consensus was reached. Each theme was
treated as a binary variable, and each comment received
either a 1 when the theme was present or 0 when the
theme was absent. Once all comments were coded, the
data were unblinded and the frequency with which any
theme emerged in the comments was compared across
contrastive conditions, with inferential statistics (Pearson
Chi-Square) used to explore if any observed differences
were meaningful. The code sheet used in contrastive
quantitative content analysis for question 2 can be found
in the supplemental information.
Results
Sample and Demographics
A total of 384 participants from the United States com-
pleted the survey; 91 participants failed the comprehen-
sion test resulting in a final sample of 293 respondents
from 38 states and theDistrict of Columbia (missingwere:
Alaska, Arizona, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia,
Wyoming). The mean age was 35.7 years old (with a
standard deviation of 11.8 years). Frequencies of sample
demographics are summarized in Table 1 in Appendix B.
Do Means Matter Morally?
An often-cited argument as to why we should explore the
possibilities of moral bioenhancement is the lack of effec-
tiveness of so-called traditional methods of moral en-
hancement, such as upbringing, socialization, and educa-
tion [10, 47, but see 22, 48]. A related argument is that
there are little principled differences between employing
traditional and potential biomedical methods of moral
betterment in terms of their ethical acceptability [49, 50].
David DeGrazia, for example, contends that many argu-
ments against biomedical means also apply to traditional,
non-biomedical means: Bone should not inculcate moral
values that are wrong, so how can a parent be sure that she
or he is justified in providing a particular type of moral
instruction? Also facing this challenge are public school
teachers who attempt to inculcate in students certainmoral
virtues such as civility, respect for differences and concern
for the poor^ [47]. Likewise, according to the so-called
‘companions in innocence’ line of reasoning [51, 52], any
principled argument against the attempt to making people
morally better using genetic means, will also apply to
educational and socialization efforts.
Other commentators have argued that there are in fact
morally relevant differences between traditional and bio-
medical moral enhancement, for example because educa-
tion is characterized by a fundamental moral equality
between educator and educated, an equality that is lacking
in the case of biomedical interventions aimed at reshaping
the moral agency of others [17]. Or, along these same
lines, because the distinction between (direct) biomedical
(neurological, pharmacological) interventions and
(indirect) traditional interventions tracks a more funda-
mental distinction between reason-responsive and reason-
bypassing interventions, or between interventions that
allow for active involvement of the person undergoing
the intervention and those interventions that do not [53].
In this study, we hypothesized that members of the
public would be less supportive of pharmacological than
of non-pharmacological programs, even if in the pro-
grams were described as being equally safe and effective.
Moreover, we expected that the public would be uncom-
fortable with mandating moral enhancement interven-
tions and with mandatory pharmacological moral inter-
ventions in particular. We tested these hypotheses with an
escalating series of morally challenging questions.
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The first question we posed asked whether it was a
good idea for the bully to participate in the program as
described in the vignette. A two way independent
ANOVA showed a significant main effect of version of
program (F(1289) = 141,57, p < 0.001). An independent
sample t-test revealed that respondents were significant-
ly more supportive of an anti-bullying program that
involved playing a video game than one that involved
taking a pill (Mdiff = 42.39, 95%CI [35.32, 49.45],
p < 0.001, d = 1.38) (Fig. 1, Participation).
We then asked respondents whether it would be a
good idea for the bully to be required to participate in
the program, using the same 101-point scale. A two way
independent ANOVA showed a significant main effect of
version of program (F(1289) = 147.26, p < 0.001). An
independent sample t-test revealed that respondents were
more supportive of a mandatory anti-bullying program
that involved playing a video game than of a mandatory
program that involved taking a pill; Mdiff = 44.68, 95%CI
[37.30, 52.05], p < 0.001, d = 1.39 (Fig. 1, Mandatory).
Thus, respondents were significantly less supportive of a
mandatory pharmacological than a mandatory non-
pharmacological anti-bullying program.
Next, we asked respondents to rate their support for a
mandatory preventive program for children who were
identified as being at higher risk of being bullies in the
future. A two way independent ANOVA showed a sig-
nificant main effect of version of program on the support
rates for the preventive anti-bullying program (F(1,
289) = 51.702, p < 0.001). An independent sample t-
test revealed that respondents supported a preventive
anti-bullying program that involved playing a video
game more than a program that involved taking a pill;
Mdiff = 27.21, 95%CI [19.77, 34.65], p < 0.001, d = 0.84
(Fig. 1, Preventive). People were less supportive of em-
pathy enhancement within the context of prevention of
future immoral behaviour as compared to support for
empathy enhancement in cases where immoral behaviour
(bullying) has already manifested itself. This is of interest
for debates on Bpublic health approaches to preventing
crime^ and growing attention for early identification and
prevention of antisocial behaviour [54–56].
Subsequently we asked respondents about empathy
enhancing programs that go beyond bullying in schools,
specifically whether it would be a good idea for all
children (not just bullies or potential bullies) to be
required to participate in the empathy-enhancing pro-
gram. A two way independent ANOVA showed a sig-
nificant main effect of version of program on the sup-
port rates for a mandatory empathy-enhancing program
Fig. 1 Mean ratings for participation, mandatory, and preventive empathy-enhancing anti-bullying programs and for empathy-enhancing
programs for all children. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals
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for all children (F(1289) = 131.005, p < 0.001). An
independent sample t-test showed that respondents sup-
ported a mandatory preventive empathy-enhancing pro-
gram for all children that involved playing a video game
more than one that involved taking a pill; Mdiff = 43.13,
95%CI [35.70, 50.57], p < 0.001, d = 1.33 (Fig. 1, All
Children). Thus, respondents were significantly less
supportive of requiring all children to participate in a
mandatory pharmacological empathy-enhancing pro-
gram compared to their support for required participa-
tion in a non-pharmacological program.
Taken together these results indicate that across a
range of questions people were consistently more trou-
bled by pharmacological than non-pharmacological
moral enhancement interventions.
The Distinction Between Self and Other
The second hypothesis driving this study is that
people rate an empathy-enhancing program differ-
ently depending on whether they are imagining that
their own child or someone else’s child is participat-
ing in the program. A previous study found that
people employ double standards when thinking
about the fairness of cognitive enhancement in situ-
ations where they would cognitively enhance them-
selves versus situations where others would do so:
people perceive the same enhancing interventions as
less ethically acceptable when other people use them
than when they themselves use them [42]. Because a
similar asymmetry may influence people’s reasoning
about moral enhancement interventions, we explored
the effects of vignettes which compared the distinc-
tion between self and other.
We tested this hypothesis in two ways. First, in
contrastive versions of the vignettes respondents
were asked to imagine either that their own child is
bullying another student in school (own child), or
that their own child is being bullied by another
student in school (other’s child). Second, we com-
pared responses to two questions in which we asked
respondents about their support for a population-
wide empathy-enhancing program (everyone else)
and their willingness to participate in such a pro-
gram themselves (self).
We first analyzed the data to see if there was a
difference between vignettes in which the empathy-
enhancing program was to be administered to one’s
own child who had been a bully (own child) versus
those in which someone else’s child had been bul-
lying the respondent’s child (other’s child). Two
way independent ANOVAs demonstrate that there
was no significant main effect of closeness to sub-
ject on the support rates for either participation
(F(1289) = .451, p = .502), mandatory participation
(F(1289) = 1.473, p = .226), or preventive approaches
to the anti-bullying program (F(1289) = .994, p = .320)
(Fig. 2).
There was a significant interaction (F(1289) = 4.4611,
p = .033) between version of program and closeness to
subject when the respondents were probed on children
being required to participate in the program, indicating
that the mean difference between other’s child and own
child differs depending on whether the program





for own child or other’s child.
Error bars represent (95%) confi-
dence intervals
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involves a pill or a video game. Pairwise comparisons
using an independent sample t-test revealed that people
were more supportive of a mandatory empathy-
enhancing program that involved taking a pill when they
imagined the child participating in the program to be an
other’s child rather their own child; Mdiff = 12.55,
95%CI [1.77, 23.32], p = .023, d = 0.38 (Fig. 2,
Mandatory).
In one of the first articles discussing moral enhance-
ment, Thom Douglas argued that unlike other types of
enhancement, moral enhancement primarily benefits
others: Bon any plausible moral theory, a person’s hav-
ing morally better motives will tend to be to the advan-
tage of others^ [5]. Others have speculated about poten-
tial societal benefits of moral bioenhancement, arguing
that, Bthey may, through contributing to civic virtue,
help to secure the good functioning of our political
institutions and processes. One way they could do this
is by facilitating the dispositions towards cooperative-
ness and trust that plausibly underpin social solidarity^
[57].
However, as Bthe advantages of moral enhancement
may fall upon society rather than on those who are
enhanced^ [53], the need to balance potential risks to the
one subjected to the program with benefits to others is
arguably a central challenge when discussing moral en-
hancement. A fundamental question is how to weigh the
interests and preferences of the individual and the interests
of others (in view of public safety and managing public
risk) [30].
To address this, we asked participants whether they
thought that society would be better off if the general
population was required to participate in an empathy-
enhancing program. As with the results presented earli-
er, a two way independent ANOVA showed a signifi-
cant main effect of version of program on the support
rates for a mandatory population-wide empathy-enhanc-
ing program (F(1289) = 67.808, p < 0.001). An inde-
pendent sample t-test revealed that respondents support-
ed a mandatory population-wide empathy-enhancing
program that involved playing a video game more than
one that involved taking a pill; Mdiff = 30.72, 95%CI
[23.27, 38.20], p < 0.001, d = 0.82 (Fig. 3a, General
population). Subsequently, we asked whether respon-
dents would be willing to participate in the empathy-
enhancing program themselves. A two way independent
ANOVA showed a significant main effect of version of
program on willingness to participate (F(1289) = 93.432,
p < 0.001). An independent sample t-test revealed that
respondents were more willing to participate in an
empathy-enhancing program that involved playing a
video game than one that involved taking a pill;
Mdiff = 39.02, 95%CI [31.11, 43.51], p < 0.001,
d = 1.13 (Fig. 3b, Self).
Finally, we asked whether participants had a his-
tory of bullying, either as perpetrators or victims of
bullying. We found that 33.8% (n = 99) of the
respondents indicated that they had been bullied in
the past to such a degree that it interfered with their
daily activities. 64.8% (n = 190) indicated that they
hadn’t been bullied (to such a degree), and 1.4%
Fig. 3 a, b Mean ratings for pharmacological and non-
pharmacological empathy-enhancing programs, either with re-
spect to the Bdegree society would be better off if the general
populationwas required to participate in the program^ and Bdegree
you would be willing to participate in the program yourself.^ Error
bars represent (95%) confidence intervals
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(n = 4) chose to not answer this question. 7.8%
(n = 23) of the respondents indicated that they had
bullied in the past to such a degree that it interfered
with someone else’s daily activities. 89.8% (n = 263)
indicated that they hadn’t bullied someone else (to
such a degree), and 2.4% (n = 7) chose to not answer
this question. Age, gender, and whether participants
had been bullied or were bullies themselves had no
influence on any of our parameters.
Reasons Offered for Attitudes Towards Empathy
Enhancement
After rating the empathy-enhancing anti-bullying pro-
gram described in the vignette on a sliding scale ranging
from good to bad idea (question 1), participants were
asked to explain why they answered as they did in a
free-response format (question 2). Responses were ana-
lyzed using contrastive qualitative content analysis (see
methods). The themes that emerged represented reasons
that fell into four main categories: Good idea, Bad idea,
Ambivalent, and Appropriate reaction to bullying (see
appendix C for the code sheet).
Good Idea
In the Good idea category, the following reasons in
support of the empathy-enhancing anti-bullying program
were given most frequently (cumulatively, across all
versions of the vignette) (Fig. 4): the program’s EFFICA-
CY (n = 106, 46.1%), the program’s SAFETY (n = 50,
21.7%), the notion that the program provides a GOOD
ALTERNATIVE to other approaches (such as ignoring
the problem or punishment) (n = 22, 9.6%), the idea that
the OBJECTIVE JUSTIFIES MEANS (in spite of po-
tential negative effects) (n = 17, 7.4%), the program’s
POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE BULLY (as it will give
him better chances in life, make him a better person, or
will increase his flourishing) (n = 15, 6%), and the idea
that the PROGRAM IS ENJOYABLE (and that this will
motivate the bully to participate) (n = 12, 5.2%).
The program’s EFFICACY (χ2 = 57.49, df = 1,
p < 0.001) and SAFETY (χ2 = 2.239, df = 1, p = 0.012),
the notion that the program provides a GOOD ALTER-
NATIVE to current interventions (χ2 = 7.166, df = 1,
p = 0.007), and the notion that the PROGRAM IS EN-
JOYABLE (χ2 = 12.598, df = 1, p < 0.001) were signif-
icantly more commonly mentioned in support of the non-
pharmacological than the pharmacological program. No
difference was found between version of the program and
the following reasons in support of the program: the notion
that the OBJECTIVE JUSTIFIES MEANS (χ2 = 3.111,
df = 1, p = 0.078), the program’s POSITIVE IMPACT on
the BULLY (χ2 = 3.494, df = 1, p = 0.062). We found no
relationship between reasons in support of the program and
closeness to subject (own child or other’s child), evenwhen
accounting for version of the program (pill or video game).
Bad Idea
In the Bad idea category, the following reasons against
the program were given most frequently (Fig. 5): the
notion that DRUGS SHOULD NOT BE USED (be-
cause they are artificial, because behavioural problems
Fig. 4 Reasons why the empathy-enhancing anti-bullying program is a Good idea (n = 230). Frequency of the theme as mentioned in
comments (total number of comments, n = 620)
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should not be remedied by taking drugs, or because
there is nothing medically wrong with the child)
(n = 68, 33.7%), the program’s SUPERFICIALITY (as
it addresses symptoms and not underlying causes, or
because it offers no durable solution) (n = 36, 17.8%),
EFFICACY DISBELIEF (disbelief that the program
will effectively lower the bullying, or disbelief that
increasing empathy will lower the bullying) (n = 32,
15.8%), the notion that ALTERNATIVE AP-
PROACHES should be tried FIRST (and that the pro-
gram should be a last resort) (n = 31, 15.3%), SAFETY
CONCERNS (concerns about side-effects, long-term
effects, and concerns about addiction) (n = 16, 7.9%).
The following concerns were more commonly
brought up against the pharmacological program com-
pared to the non-pharmacological program: the notion
that DRUGS SHOULD NOT BE USED (χ2 = 87.949,
df = 1, p < 0.001), the SUPERFICIALITY of the pro-
gram (χ2 = 12.513, df = 1, p < 0.001), the notion that
ALTERNATIVES should be tried FIRST (χ2 = 18.909,
df = 1, p < 0.001), and SAFETY CONCERNS
(χ2 = 16.809, df = 1, p < 0.001). No difference was
found between versions of the program for EFFICACY
DISBELIEF (χ2 = 2.307, df = 1, p = 0.129).
Chi-squared tests were performed to determine wheth-
er there was a relation between reasons why respondents
rated the program as a bad idea and their imagined close-
ness to the bully (own child or other’s child).We found no
significant relationship between closeness to subject (own
child or other’s child) and particular reasons provided
against the program without stratifying for version of
program (pharmacological or non-pharmacological).
However, the notion that ALTERNATIVES should be
tried FIRST (χ2 = 5.930, df = 1, p = 0.015) and SAFETY
CONCERNS (χ2 = 36.886, df = 1, p = 0.049) were more
commonly mentioned as reasons against the program
when the program described in the vignette was a phar-
macological program intended for one’s own child. More-
over, we found that comments by respondents imaging
their own child participating in a pharmacological pro-
gram were more often coded as AMBIVALENT
(χ2 = 4.848, df = 1, p = 0.028).
Respondents appear to perceive a difference in safety
between non-pharmacological and pharmacological pro-
grams, in spite of the fact that the empathy-enhancing
program was presented as equally safe and effective in
contrasting versions of the vignettes. When confronted
with a non-pharmacological program, many respondents
indicated that the program’s safetywas an important reason
for their support of the program, whereas respondents who
had read a vignette that described a pharmacological pro-
gram mentioned concerns about safety as a reason against
the program. Moreover, concerns about safety were more
commonly mentioned in response to pharmacological pro-
grams intended for own child than for other’s child.
Appropriate Reactions to Bullying
In their answers, respondents oftentimes not only pro-
vided reasons for or against the program, but also ex-
plained what they considered to be an appropriate reac-
tion to bullying. Appropriate strategies to alleviate bul-
lying that were mentioned by respondents were:
TEACHING (n = 48, 31.4%), EMPATHY (n = 41,
Fig. 5 Reasons why the empathy-enhancing anti-bullying program is a Bad idea (n = 202). Frequency of the theme as mentioned in
comments (total number of comments, n = 620)
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26.8%), UNDERSTANDING (n = 35, 22.9%), HELP
(n = 19, 12.4%), PUNISHMENT (n = 8, 5.2%), and
moral AGENCY (n = 2, 1.3%) (Fig. 6).
Moreover, respondents frequentlymade explicit wheth-
er they thought the program as described in the vignette
indeed consisted of the strategy to alleviate bullying that
they preferred or found to bemost promising (Fig. 7). Chi-
square tests were performed to determine whether there
was a relationship between what respondents considered
an appropriate reaction to bullying, and version of the
program (pill or video game). Respondents more com-
monly reasoned that the bully needed HELP when
confronted with a pharmacological rather than a non-
pharmacological program (χ2 = 4.493, df = 1,
p < 0.034) (data not shown). We found no significant
relation between version of program and respondents in-
dicating that the bully needed TEACHING, EMPATHY,
UNDERSTANDING, PUNISHMENT, or AGENCY.
When the program described in the vignette
consisted of playing a video game, respondents more
commonly expressed that they considered the program
an adequate reaction to bullying (χ2 = 8.502, df = 1,
p = 0.004), while when the program involved taking a
pill, respondents more commonly indicated that they did
not consider the program an adequate reaction to bully-
ing (χ2 = 23.298, df = 1, p < 0.001) (Fig. 7).
In conclusion, the difference between self and other
(either between one’s own child and an other’s child, or
between the general population and oneself) influences
the public’s support for moral enhancement. For the
pharmacological empathy-enhancing program, respon-
dents were more critical when they imagined their own
child rather than an other’s child to be the one subjected
to the program. They more often expressed ambiva-
lence, mentioned safety concerns, and argued that alter-
natives should be tried first. And as regards the
pharmacological program, respondents were more open
to requiring the general population to participate in the
program, but were less willing to participate themselves.
However, the difference between self and other was
largely absent for vignettes describing a non-
pharmacological program, suggesting that this distinc-
tion is morally salient only when safety and risk con-
cerns come into play.
Discussion
This study provides empirical evidence thatmeans matter
morally. For when it comes to moral enhancement, mem-
bers of the public generally eschew pharmacological mor-
al bioenhancement yet are open to non-biomedical means
to attainmoral enhancement. Both the quantitative and the
qualitative data confirm that the public disapprove of
biomedical interventions for moral enhancement. These
findings were confirmed convincingly across a range of
questions and in all versions of the vignettes.
These findings are in line with previous research dem-
onstrating a considerable bias against ormistrust of Bpills^
in general [58–60]. The added value of this study is that it
sheds light on what kind of reasons members of the public
have for their dislike of pharmacological interventions.
Interestingly, when reflecting on the non-pharmacological
program, many respondents explicated their support by
reference to the fact that the program is described as safe
and effective in the vignette. However, respondents who
had read a vignette about the pharmacological program
were often sceptical about the program’s safety and effec-
tiveness, even though the program was described as
equally safe and effective in the vignette. Again, as might
be expected based on earlier research, respondents argued
that pills are bad because they are artificial or unnatural,
Fig. 6 Appropriate reactions to
bullying (n = 153). Frequency of
the theme as mentioned in
comments (total number of
comments, n = 620). (Inner
circle = pill, outer circle = video
game)
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expressed concerns about safety and undue medicaliza-
tion (over-medicalization) of behavioural problems [61,
62]. In addition however, many respondents reasoned that
the pharmacological program offered no Breal^ solution to
the problem; they were sceptical about the long-term
effectiveness of the program and expressed concerns
about the pharmacological program being too superficial
and not adequately addressing underlying causes of the
bullying behaviour. With the video game, respondents
were more optimistic about its lasting effects.
Moreover, many respondents explained that the reason
why they did or did not support the empathy-enhancing
program in the vignette was related to whether or not they
were under the impression that the program offered an
appropriate pedagogical response to the problem behav-
iour (bullying). This might be interpreted as an indication
that the public values fostering in children deeper under-
standing of and insight into why certain behaviour is
morally wrong rather than mere conformity to (moral)
rules. The public appears concerned not only about effec-
tiveness (will an intervention reliably lower the immoral
behaviour?) but also about whether the one participating
in the program will, as a result of the intervention, have
learned something on a deeper level and in the longer run.
One important consideration in interpreting these re-
sults is the fact that the scenario in our vignettes concerns
bullying by a 13-year-old child. People might be particu-
larly resistant to giving pharmacological substances to
children, and different ethical considerations may come
into play, for example about the responsibility of parents
and schools. However, comments given in the open-
response boxes indicate that the concerns respondents
have go beyondmere ‘pills are bad’-considerations.More-
over, next to empathy enhancement in children, we also
asked respondents about their support for empathy en-
hancement for the general population and for themselves.
Concerns about the importance of doing the right
thing, period as opposed to doing the right thing for the
right reasons are also raised in the ethical debate onmoral
bioenhancement. Douglas [25] discusses so-called
Bsuperficiality concerns^ about forms of non-cognitive
or reason-bypassing interventions that directly alter emo-
tions. These interventions can be considered brute as
opposed to deliberate [63], because they directly alter
emotions without requiring the exercise of deliberative
faculties, such as Bmoral reasoning, introspective reflec-
tion on one’s moral failures, or calm moral discussion
with others^ [64]. Douglas argues that these kinds of
interventions are sometimes permissible [5]; Persson
and Savulescu even argue that moral bioenhancement
might be morally obligatory [11]. Other commentators
disagree and reason that pharmacological or neuro-
scientific interventions fail to produce deepmoral under-
standing and deep moral improvement because these
kinds of interventions fail to provide any moral content.3
Harris maintains that to be a moral agent is to consider
moral reasons for action. He argues that direct, reason-
bypassing interventions Bmight well take the conduct of
the affected individual beyondmoral review and certainly
out of the realm of things that might be right all things
considered^ [66]. Jotterand stresses that on a virtue eth-
ical account, both moral emotions and moral reasoning
are essential for autonomy and true moral agency:
BOn my analysis, I conclude that moral
neuroenhancement is unlikely to morally enhance
people in the true meaning of the word. The devel-
opment of neurotechnologies will allow us to con-
trol moral emotions but not to generate any content
for moral reasons for actions. Without a systematic
reflection on the nature of the good, the right and the
just, one would end up, using MacIntyre’s lan-
guage, in bad character because of intellectual
blindness. Moral agency requires understanding
3 Baertschi [65] explains that these disagreements can partly be attrib-
uted to different (i.e. cognitivist versus sentimentalist) meta-ethical
positions.
Fig. 7 Does the program provides an adequate reaction to bullying or not (n = 153). Frequency of the theme as mentioned in comments
(total number of comments, n = 620)
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and the formation of right moral emotions. (…) The
hope of controlling human moral emotions is insuf-
ficient for the formation of virtuous people. Moral
agents are not engineered but trained through the
development of a vision of the good life and an
understanding of human flourishing.^ [67]
These comments suggest that at least some philosophical
positions in the ongoing debate align with public opinion.
Indeed, the reasons participants offered in their free re-
sponses reflect to large extent key themes discussed in the
neuroethics literature.4 Furthermore, it is one thing to argue
eloquently for or against the propriety of such things as
mandatory biomedical moral enhancement and quite an-
other to accept that mandate for yourself, or even more
importantly for your children. Except under the auspices of
a totalitarian state, the prospect of widely disseminating
moral bioenhancement depends entirely upon the acces-
sion of the public. Our data demonstrate quite clearly that
support for such a project is absent, even though advancing
themoral skills of the populace enjoyswidespread support.
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